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ABSTRACT. The euro crisis made visible the omitted stage in the European integra- 
tion process. The EU jumped from the common market straight to the monetary 
union, neglecting the formation of the economic union. The new EU economic 
governance is a combination of a vertical shift of competences, i.e. from one level of 
government to another level, and a horizontal shift of powers and competences, i.e. 
from elected governments to unelected government bodies entrusted with (parts of) 
government policies, from discretionary policy towards rules. The purpose of this paper 
is to analyze the new EU economic governance within the conceptual framework of 
these vertical and horizontal shifts. This two-dimensional approach offers a better 
analytical tool than the more traditional one-dimensional fiscal federalism approach. 
In the first part of the paper the focus is on the policy domains that are the objects in 
the shifting process. Budgetary policy mainly is at stake, but also banking regulation 
and monetary policy are partly involved. The second part of the paper deals with the 
relevant aspects of the theories on the division of powers along vertical and hori- 
zontal lines. The fiscal federalism approach to vertical separation and the time 
consistency theory on the horizontal distribution of power are briefly exposed. In the 
third part the relevant aspects of the new EU economic governance of the European 
semester, six-pack, two-pack and fiscal compact are presented and put into our 
framework of vertical and horizontal power shifts. 
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“Un train peut en cacher un autre.” 
 
1. What Should Be Governed? 
 
The subject of this paper is the new EU economic governance. Depending on 
the source the meaning of this concept tends to be different. At all times 
supervising budgetary and macroeconomic policy is part of it. This is the so-
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called “fiscal union.” Also a stronger control of financial institutions, the so-
called “banking union,” usually falls under the concept. We also count in the 
extra dimension in monetary policy since the introduction of so-called “non-
standard” measures. Furthermore the development of a European fiscal ca- 
pacity with the various mechanisms and institutions (i.e. the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility 
and the European Stability Mechanism) created in the wake of the eurocrisis 
are taken by us to be part of the concept of new economic governance. 
This evolvement of economic governance can be regarded as a – retarded 
– completion of economic union in the Balassa (1961) sequence of integration 
stages. In this stage the goal is to coordinate or even harmonize economic 
policies. Balassa himself vaguely mentions the suppression of “restrictions on 
commodity and factor policies.” Economic union precedes “total economic 
integration.” This final stage in integration presumes “the unification of 
monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-
up of a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member 
states.” The monetary union and the introduction of the euro brought about 
this stage, in a partial sense however since not all EU member states par- 
ticipate and only monetary policy was unified. EU economic governance than 
fills the gap, giving substance to the “Economic” in Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
This paper focuses on the three policy domains that occupy a central 
place in the way the euro crisis is approached through the new economic 
governance of the EU. The euro crisis appears in two forms: on the one hand 
problems in the financial sector and on the other hand public finance prob- 
lems. 
The banking crisis that emerged late 2007 was caused by risk policies of 
financial institutions gone wrong and the apparent inability of the authorities 
to assess the systemic risks. This failure led the governments to the re-
examination of financial supervision. Hence the first policy that we include 
in this paper. The modifications to supervision contain elements of a vertical 
shift, from national monitoring to European supervision, as well as a hori- 
zontal shift, from political authorities to independent bodies. 
The approach of the banking problems through government interventions 
such as state guarantees and recapitalization led to the transmission of the 
financial crisis to the fiscal domain. Within the euro area, the fiscal problems 
were also caused by the irresponsible fiscal policies in some Member States 
such as Greece and Portugal.  
In the short-term approach to the euro crisis the European Central Bank 
was involved. This brings the monetary policy into the picture. This is an 
example of a policy domain that, on the vertical axis, has moved completely 
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to the supranational level, and, on the horizontal axis, is completely situated 
in the corner of independence. 
In the longer term the focus is on the reform of budget rules. The simul- 
taneous vertical and horizontal shift is highly visible here. The new EU 
economic governance puts its stakes on a Europeanisation of budgetary policy 
by stiffening the European grip on budget rules, but also by the introduction 
of stabilization mechanisms and facilities in order to organize financial soli- 
darity between EU member states. Furthermore, plans for the introduction of 
Eurobonds and the idea to create “a fiscal capacity” (Van Rompuy, 2012) 
add to this process. 
 
2. Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts 
 
2.1. Vertical Shifts: Fiscal Federalism 
 
The problem that the fiscal federalism approach wants to solve is situated in 
the spatial context in which markets and governments operate. The range of 
markets is determined by consumer tastes, distances, transport costs, type of 
product. This range can be different for each individual good or service. As a 
consequence market failures are also diverse in their spatial dimension. In 
principle the level of government responsible for correcting a market failure 
should correspond to the spatial reach of the market in question. In practice 
the number of government levels is limited, which means that there is no 
perfect match between the economically relevant spatial reach and the polit- 
ical space where the market failure is tackled. Nonetheless also the number 
of government levels is not given. New levels are created (levels seldom are 
abolished) and competences can shift between levels. 
Fiscal federalism has as its aim to provide insight into the question of 
which governmental functions in the economy have to be placed with which 
government levels. To that purpose a good starting point is the subdivision 
by Musgrave (1959) of economic functions of government in allocation, 
redistribution and stabilization. Each of the three policy domains covered in 
this paper – budgetary policy, monetary policy and banking supervision – 
must be assigned to the three Musgravian functions.  
Concerning redistribution the conventional wisdom is that it should be 
placed at highest level possible. Lower levels of government, considering to 
engage in redistribution risk to be confronted with inflows of relatively low 
incomes and outflows of relatively high incomes. On the one hand this 
would exert an upward pressure on pending and a downward pressure on the 
tax base and tax income. As distances increase, this kind of unwanted mobility 
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is supposed to decrease. The higher the level of redistribution, the longer the 
distances and the smaller the mentioned kind of mobility. 
Another argument in favor of keeping the redistribution as central as 
possible comes from situations in which personal redistribution cannot avoid 
income distribution between jurisdictions that is considered too unequal. In 
that case a central redistribution policy towards local jurisdictions can be 
needed. A cause of such a situation can be tax bases differing strongly be- 
cause of differing stages of development. Especially when this occurs within 
a monetary union and the exchange rate instrument cannot be used to correct 
imbalances, an internal redistribution can be attractive. Thus it is the known 
context of the European structural funds, as well as the explicit redistribution 
system of the Finanzausgleich in Germany and the implicit transfers between 
Flanders and Walloonia in Belgium. 
Macroeconomic stabilization is a function that economist like to reserve 
for higher levels of government. Stabilization policy quickly looses effective- 
ness as the economy becomes more open. The more important external trade 
and financial flows become vis-à-vis the rest of the economy, the bigger the 
leaks that would be brought about by a stabilization policy through the 
budget. Stabilization through monetary policy is even more problematic at a 
lower level since the main instrument of this policy, the control over the 
money supply, is usually situated at central levels. 
In the field of allocation several opinions are possible. Some of these 
opinions lead to a preference for a lower level of government as preferred 
level: differences in preferences between jurisdictions, the subsidiarity prin- 
ciple and the Tiebout theorem. Other opinions tend to prefer more centralized 
levels for the allocation function: the phenomena of tax export, tax com- 
petition and spill over effects, and economies of scale in tax collection and in 
the production of public services. In general the former opinions tend to 
dominate, so most economists would favor as much decentralization in 
allocation as is possible. 
We know apply these insights from fiscal federalism to the three policy 
domains in the EU new economic governance. We assume a simple multi- 
level governance framework with two levels of government: supranational 
and national (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Government policies, functions and levels 
 budgetary policy monetary policy banking supervision 
Supranational level stabilization & 
redistribution 
stabilization allocation 
National level stabilization & 
allocation 
stabilization allocation 
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Budgetary policy covers the three Musgravian functions. From the theory of 
fiscal federalism we detain that budgetary policy with stabilization and re- 
distribution as objectives are best situated at a higher level, while budgetary 
policy aiming at allocation is best situated at a lower level (see Table 1). 
Monetary policy mainly is a matter of stabilization and is therefore best 
placed at higher levels of government. The choice of exchange rate system is 
relevant here. In a system of fixed exchange rates, and a fortiori a common 
currency system, monetary policy has to be conducted by definition at the 
level of the fixed rate or currency zone. In a floating rate system the national 
level can keep its responsibility over monetary policy. The need for banking 
supervision follows from the contingency of market failure in the form of 
systemic risk. Here government has to avoid the external effects of eventual 
bankruptcy of a financial institution. The degree of market integration with 
other countries then determines which level of government is best suited for 
banking supervision. The higher the degree of market integration, the higher 
the level at which supervision should be organized. 
Anticipating on the next paragraph, it becomes clear by now that the 
degree of market integration within the European Union has an important 
impact on the decision on which level responsibility for the three policy 
domains should be placed. The creation of a single market in the European 
Union has caused the Europeanization of financial markets and institutions 
and the need to control them on a European level. The creation of the mone- 
tary union caused the obvious shift of monetary policy to the supranational 
level and initiated the less obvious and much discussed shift of budgetary 
powers. The euro crisis speeded up this discussion. 
 
2.2. Horizontal Shifts: Credibility, Rules and Independence 
 
The interest taken by academics in the credibility of economic policy orig- 
inated in the eighties. Especially the numerous exchange rate alignments in 
the European Monetary System created a fertile breeding ground for this 
attention. The credibility of central banks and the role therein of indepen- 
dence from politics took a central place in this discussion. The credibility 
issue was however not confined to exchange rate policy but was quickly 
applied to the general macroeconomic policy. It entered the domain of fiscal 
policy through the introduction of budgetary rules. By the end of the 20th 
century the interest in credibility spread to microeconomic policy areas, 
leading to insights in how best to address the regulation of economic sectors 
such as network industries. Credibility emerged as an important concept, as 
well as independence as a condition for credibility. 
The “credibility hypothesis” is stated extensively in the literature (Gilardi, 
2002; Gilardi 2006, Genoud, 2003, Larsen et al. 2006). Credibility is a valuable 
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asset for governments, because rational individuals base their expectations on 
all economically available information at the moment of decision. Rational 
actors’ beliefs are influenced by beliefs about future actions of policy makers. 
Credibility is the capacity for inspiring belief. A credible policy is a policy 
worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable. A politician/government/ 
regulator is credible when agents believe he will fulfill his promises. Cred- 
ibility is needed when coercion is not an option for policy makers.  
Connected to credible policy making is the time-inconsistency problem.  
A typical situation is posed by investment decisions in a liberalized setting. 
These decisions are made by private investors and not longer by government 
itself or by public companies. Another typical situation is when economic 
actors make decisions about wages and prices in the context of the goals for 
monetary policy set by government. 
This latter kind of situation was the starting point for the literature on 
central bank independence. In a seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
stress the importance of an independent central bank because there is a 
potential conflict between policymakers’ discretion and policy optimality, 
called the “time inconsistency of policy.” Often policymakers need to credibly 
bind themselves to a fixed and pre-announced course of action. Otherwise 
the danger exists that policy is altered because of changes in preferences of 
policymakers (Gilardi 2006).  
In a more general sense a time consistent policy is a policy that will be 
sustained as circumstances change over time. Adhering to a policy rule may 
require pursuing a policy at a particular point in time that is not optimal at 
that time. In contrast, policy that is time inconsistent will be reversed in the 
future due to predictable developments over time. In a typical democratic 
setting time inconsistency will be the rule rather than the exception as 
democracies are characterized by the short term time horizons of politicians 
in view of elections and by the accompanying changes of the ruling party or 
coalition. 
A device to guarantee a time consistent policy is to create a commitment 
mechanism for removing the risk of opportunistic policy in particular con- 
tingencies. Usually two devices are available. The first is to delegate decision 
making to an independent institution. Independence for regulators can act as 
such a commitment mechanism (Gilardi, 2002). In this way, governments 
prohibit themselves and future policymakers from taking these short-sighted 
decisions. They “tie their hands,” so it will be politically more costly to over- 
rule a decision made by an agency. Thus policymakers cannot use discre- 
tionary policy as a mechanism to favor a particular interest group. The more 
independent an agency is, the more credible the policy is for stakeholders, 
potential investors, consumers, etc. Policymakers delegate to increase the 
credibility of their policy commitments. A second device is to install policy 
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rules. Politicians give up their discretion in decision-making and commit to a 
policy rule that was set previously by another government at the same of or 
at a higher level. In that way politicians again tie their hands to analogous 
effects as with delegation. 
For the purpose of this paper the relevant policy domains to study with 
respect to delegation and rules are financial supervision that constitutes a part 
of regulatory policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
In regulatory policy, especially in the aftermath of utilities privatization 
and liberalization (Gilardi 2002 and 2006), credibility is mainly pursued by 
delegating competences to independent institutions. Policy makers have in- 
centives to promise a favorable regulatory environment to attract investors, 
necessary for fostering competition. Once relatively irreversible investments 
are made, policymakers may be tempted to go back on their commitment. 
Rational investors will not invest in the first place, creating a suboptimal 
situation. In the literature this is called the “hold up” problem (Kirkpatrick, 
Parker & Zheng 2006). To avoid this problem governments all over the world 
have established independent regulators to take over the implementation of 
regulatory policy. In the field of finance independent supervisors have been 
around for several decennia. 
In the field of fiscal policy the problem has mainly been tackled in 
another way, namely by introducing fiscal rules. This does not forego that 
delegation of parts of the fiscal policy making (f.i. forecasting growth) has 
taken place in some countries at some points in time. The objective of fiscal 
policy is to run the budget in the interest of society along the three Mus- 
gravian functions. The budget is the instrument of fiscal policy. It has itself 
the characteristic of a common pool resource, in the sense that exclusion of 
various special interest groups calling on the budget is difficult while this 
appeal is rival. This feature leads to so called deficit bias, meaning that the 
frequency of negative budget balances tend to be higher than the frequency 
of positive balances. The perspective of spending more and taxing less in a 
recession is attractive to politicians. In that case they can meet the multiple 
budgetary wishes of interest groups and voters without having to let pay the 
price in the form of higher taxes, all this in hope of an electoral return. The 
inverse does not happen in an overheated economy: against the prescription 
of functional finance no surplus is created. Higher taxes and lower spending 
are not very attractive from an electoral point of view. Politicians steer clear 
of them and infect public finance wit a deficit bias. This deficit bias reflects 
a time inconsistency problem in the sense described in the preceding para- 
graph whereby the long-term discipline objective is systematically overlooked 
when short-term discretion is being used.  
The adoption of fiscal rules has been considered as the instrument of 
choice to deal with deficit bias (Debrun & Kumar 2008). The history of 
 84 
fiscal rules is impressive. All over the world over the last decennia countries 
have experimented with fiscal rules. A fiscal rule is defined as “a permanent 
constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of 
fiscal performance” (Kopits & Symansky 1998). There are rules available on 
deficit limits, spending limits, taxing limits, debt limits, etc. (see IMF, 2009). 
Nevertheless there is no consensus in the literature on whether fiscal rules 
are a robust remedy against the deficit bias. This is painfully shown by the 
recent Greek and Irish case, but it was already predicted in tempore non 
suspecto: “In the particular case of monetary unions, the centralization of 
monetary policy can reduce individual countries’ incentives for fiscal discipline. 
Normally, the unpleasant prospect that excessive public debt may ultimately 
increase future inflation and interest rates is likely to impose some self-
restraint on governments. In a monetary union, however, this effect is likely 
to be diluted, particularly for the smaller members of the union, and could lead 
to excessive debt accumulation (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). In addition, 
monetary unions can entail a moral hazard related to the greater likelihood of 
a bailout by other member states or by the common central bank” (Debrun et 
al. 2009). 
This brings us to delegation to fiscal institutions as an alternative or a 
complement to fiscal rules. Debrun et al. (2009) make a distinction between 
two types of fiscal institutions. The first type are called fiscal councils. 
These councils take up tasks of independent analysis, forecasts or normative 
judgments and in this way help to improve fiscal policy. Van Meensel (2008) 
attributes either positive or normative functions to fiscal councils. To the 
first category belong institutions, which make up macroeconomics forecasts, 
public finance forecasts, impact analyses of shocks and policies. The second 
institutional category makes policy recommendations and/or assessments of 
fiscal performance in comparison with targets. Neither type of fiscal councils 
receives any specific authority over fiscal policy (Bogaert et al. 2006). Fiscal 
councils add value to the policy process by affecting policymakers’ incentives 
and motivations. There can be an impact through public debate of the find- 
ings of fiscal councils. There is evidence suggesting that fiscal councils of 
the second category generally contribute more to fiscal discipline than those 
of the first category (Debrun et al. 2009). 
In monetary policy delegation as well as policy rules have been used 
extensively. Nowadays more or less independent central banks are standard 
procedure in most Western countries, while rules – in this context usually 
called targets – are widely used. Taylor (2013) points to the eighties and 
nineties, a period of “the more rule focus on price stability and the closer 
adherence to simple predictable policy rules,” while since then “monetary 
policy became much less rule like.” Goodfriend (2012) and Issing (2012) 
comment on the shifts in independence of central banks in the long term.  
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3. Transformation of EU Economic Governance 
 
3.1. New European Fiscal Rules and Involvement 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact as it was conceived since 2005 was not up to 
the task of avoiding the budgetary problems related to the euro crisis. 
Although there have been tens of violations of the pact, there have been very 
few sanctions. In the wake of the euro crisis the insight developed that the 
absence of a really enforceable and European wide framework for fiscal 
policy was responsible for this crisis. To give substance to this so-called 
“economic governance” takes time, however, given the complicated decision 
making system in the European Union. Moreover this economic governance 
is not limited to budgetary policy (“fiscal governance”) in the member states. 
It also includes broader measures to tackle macroeconomic imbalances. 
The framework for budgetary policy in the new EU economic governance 
consists of 
• The European semester 
• The measures of the so-called “six-pack” 
• The “fiscal compact” 
• The measures of the “two-pack.” 
 
The system of the European semester was used for the first time in 2011 and 
introduces a coordinated cycle for the supervision of the economic and fiscal 
policies of the member states. Before economic policies of the member 
states were discussed in the EU in the spring, separately from the discussions 
on fiscal policies that were held in the autumn. The European semester 
combines the European governance in the first semester of the calendar year. 
Following the European semester the member states can take necessary 
decisions on their fiscal policies for the following fiscal year in the “national” 
semester. In this way the European semester brings forward and strengthens 
the supervision of the stability and convergence programs submitted by the 
member states. Starting point is the Commission’s January growth report. In 
February come the debates and briefing in the thematic Councils of Ministers 
and the European Parliament. The European Council then decides on the 
priorities in March and in April member states submit their stability or 
convergence program. In June the European Council approves the country-
specific recommendations. 
The “six-pack” consists of five regulations and one directive. They are in 
force since December 2011. The measures in the six-pack start from the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact and reinforce and supplement 
them. The preventive arm of the pact is reinforced by an improved monitor- 
ing of the medium term structural targets. An expenditure benchmark will be 
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used in function of the medium term potential growth. A sanction in the 
form of an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2 % of GDP is foreseen for non-
compliant member states. The strengthening of the corrective arm mainly 
consists of the operationalization of the debt criterion. The excess of the debt 
ratio above 60% of GDP has to decrease by 1/20 yearly. An important 
modification was implemented in the decision making process on sanctions 
in the excessive deficit procedure. Sanctions are now decided upon by 
reversed qualified majority voting, meaning that in the Ecofin Council of 
Ministers a sanction can only be avoided when a qualified majority is found. 
The six-pack also contains a directive that has to be transposed by 2014. 
This directive envisages the obligation for the member states to involve an 
institution independent from politics in certain aspects of the budgetary 
process. Finally the six-pack also foresees a closer monitoring of macro- 
economic imbalances. The Commission introduced “scoreboards” wherein 
important macroeconomic indicators for the member states are listed and 
compared to preset targets. 
The “fiscal compact” actually is the budgetary part of the broader Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance concluded on 2 March 2012 by 
25 EU member states. The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic opted to 
stay out of this treaty. The Treaty came into force on the 1st of January 2013. 
It is an intergovernmental agreement and as such is not a part of the EU 
legislation. The fiscal compact introduces the “golden rule” whereby the 
structural fiscal deficit may not be higher than 0.5% of GDP (1% for mem- 
ber states with a debt ratio exceeding 60% of GDP). There is an automatic 
correction mechanism, with escape clauses however for exceptional economic 
conditions. Independent budgetary councils at the member states level have 
to control the compliance with this rule. The rule has to be implemented in 
national legislation and the European Court of Justice can impose a fine of 
0.1% of GDP in case this implementation is not properly done. 
On top of these measures two other regulations came into force in May 
2013. One regulation again concerns an explicitation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and specifically of the excessive deficit procedure. The role of 
numerical fiscal rules and of the independent fiscal councils that have to 
monitor the compliance with the rules is specified. This is done against the 
background of a timeline that explicits the timing of the submission of draft 
budgetary plans and the assessment of these plans by the European Com- 
mission. The second regulation concerns strengthened surveillance of coun- 
tries in difficulties. 
The new EU economic governance in the fiscal domain not only deals 
with stricter rules, monitoring and sanctioning. It also addresses the problem 
of financial solidarity between member states. There are several aspects of a 
stronger financial involvement of the EU in the budgetary function. The 
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acute crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus have inspired the 
European Union to set up financial rescue operations. The European Finan- 
cial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) supports all EU Member States, with 
current focus on euro area Member States, up to EUR 60 billion, activated 
for Ireland for up to EUR 22.5 billion and for Portugal for up to EUR 26 
billion. The European Financial Stability Facilty (EFSF) was also created in 
response to the financial crisis that began in 2008 and provided temporary 
stability support to euro-area Member States. It is a société anonyme set up 
under Luxembourgish law on 7 June 2010, as part of the May 2010 package, 
mandated to provide financial assistance on a temporary basis and thus able 
to enter into new programs only until 30 June 2013; although the EFSF will 
continue to service existing commitments thereafter. The EFSF provides 
financial assistance to euro area Member States, linked to appropriate con- 
ditionality. It obtains financing by issuing bonds or other debt instruments on 
the financial markets backed by guarantees of the shareholder Member States. 
These guarantees total €780 billion. As a result of the Greek, Irish and 
Portuguese programs, the EFSF has effective guarantees totaling €726 billion 
that provide a lending capacity of €440 billion. Contrary to the EFSF the 
European Stability Mechanism (EMS) is a permanent international financial 
institution that assists in preserving the financial stability of the European 
Union monetary union by providing temporary stability support to euro area 
Member States. The ESM was finally inaugurated on 8 October 2012 upon 
completion of the ratification process by the participating euro area Member 
States. The ESM issues bonds or other debt instruments on the financial 
markets to raise capital to provide assistance to member states. Unlike the 
EFSF, which was based upon euro area member state guarantees, the ESM 
has a total subscribed capital of €700 billion provided by euro area member 
states. €80 billion of this is in the form of paid-in capital with the remaining 
€620 billion as callable capital. This subscribed capital provides a lending 
capacity for the ESM of €500 billion. 
Besides these rescue operations already in place the European Union is 
discussing further ideas on expanding its budgetary role. Van Rompuy (2012) 
launched the idea of “establishing a well-defined and limited fiscal capacity 
to improve the absorption of country specific economic shocks, through an 
insurance system set up at the central level.” The European Commission in 
December 2011 published a green paper on “the feasibility of introducing 
Stability Bonds” (European Commission 2011). One of the ideas proposed is 
to let member states finance the part of their government debt under 60% of 
gdp through the common issuance of bonds. This would enable the member 
countries with a lower creditworthiness to benefit from the lower interest 
rates paid in the capital markets by more creditworthy member states for that 
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part of their debt. The debt above 60% of GDP should still be financed by 
individual issuance. 
Last item to mention is a proposal by the former president of the ECB, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, who proposes to replace the sanctioning fines in case a 
member state has an excessive deficit by fiscal measures taken proposed by 
the European Commission and endorsed by the European Council and the 
European Parliament (De Standaard 2013). 
 
3.2. The Formation of a Banking Union 
 
The banking crisis in the Euro Area and wider has led the EU to undertake of 
steps by the EU towards the creation of a banking union. The intention of a 
banking union is to transfer to the European level the mechanisms of finan- 
cial supervision and the prevention and remediation of banking crises. 
Elliot (2012) points at the following more detailed reasons for a banking 
union: 
• Dealing with existing bank weaknesses that contributes to the euro crisis; 
• Reducing the risk that banking will contribute to later stages of the euro 
crisis; 
• Restoring the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy; 
• Reintegrating the European banking system; 
• Fixing long-standing problems with the single market in EU banking. 
 
The Euro Area poses specific risks, as pooled monetary responsibilities have 
spurred close economic and financial integration. Cross-border spill-over 
effects in the event of bank crises are more likely to occur. Moreover the link 
between sovereign debt and bank debt and the vicious circle which has led to 
taxpayers’ money being used to rescue banks in the EU has to be broken. 
Next there is an increasing risk of fragmentation of EU banking markets. This 
risk significantly undermines the single market for financial services and 
impairs the effective transmission of monetary policy to the real economy 
throughout the Euro Area.  
Before elaborating on the way the EU tackles these problems, a short 
general introduction on banking supervision is warranted. The role of gov- 
ernment regarding external effects in the financial sector has two dimensions. 
The first dimension is macroprudential supervision that has to keep an eye 
on the stability of the financial system. Stability is the capacity of the finan- 
cial system to withstand shocks and financial imbalances. Disturbances in 
financial intermediation should be avoided by this kind of supervision at the 
same time guaranteeing an efficient transmission of savings to profitable 
investments. The second dimension is microeconomic supervision. This kind 
of supervision is in the first place responsible for the solidity of individual 
 89 
financial institutions (microprudential supervision). It concerns capital require- 
ments as laid down in the successive versions of the Basel Agreements 
(Basel I, Basel II, Basel III). In the second place it deals with the conduct of 
business supervision aimed at the way financial institutions deal with cus- 
tomers. To this purpose supervisors usually introduce on the supply of infor- 
mation to customers, on the integrity of management and staff, acceptable 
commercial practices, marketing practices, etc. (Llewellyn, 1999). 
In a first approach the EU undertook to coordinate the supervision of 
individual member states over their financial sector. To this end the Euro- 
pean System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was established at the beginning 
of 2011 to implement the de Larosière Group’s proposed greater integration 
of European financial supervision. This supervisory network consists of the 
national supervisory authorities of the 27 EU member states, the three new 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), their Joint Committee and the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Together with the national super- 
visory authorities, the three ESAs (the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)) help to improve 
the quality and coherence of microprudential supervision in the EU and to 
strengthen cross-border supervision. 
However when the euro crisis deepened this step quickly appeared to be 
insufficient. “Coordination between supervisors is vital but the crisis has 
shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a 
single currency and that there is a need for common decision making” (Euro- 
pean Commission, 2012b). 
The next answer to the crisis was the creation of a banking union. To that 
end the Commission proposed to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). A unanimous agreement was reached on this proposal in the ECOFIN 
Council on 13 December. Following trilogue negotiations during January and 
February, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission reached agreement 
on the package on 19 March 2013 (European Commission 2013). 
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the 
first step towards a banking union. Next steps will include also a single bank 
resolution mechanism, underpinned by a single rulebook and a common 
deposit guarantee scheme. 
The SSM applies to all the euro-area member states and is open to the 
participation of other member states. To that end these non-euro area member 
states may establish a close cooperation between their supervisory authorities 
and the ECB.  
The Regulation establishing the SSM confers key supervisory tasks and 
powers to the ECB over all the 6000 credit institutions established within the 
euro area. The ECB carries out its tasks within a SSM composed of the ECB 
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and national competent authorities. The ECB shall ensure the coherent and 
consistent application of the Single rulebook in the euro area. It will directly 
supervise banks having assets of more than EUR 30 billion or constituting at 
least 20% of their home country’s GDP or which have requested or received 
direct public financial assistance from the EFSF or the ESM. Less significant 
banks will be supervised by national supervisors, while these supervisors will 
be under the monitoring of the ECB. 
The ECB may at any moment decide however to directly supervise one or 
more of these credit institutions to ensure consistent application of super- 
visory standards. The work of the national supervisors is integrated into the 
SSM. For instance, the ECB will send instructions to national supervisors, and 
national supervisors have a duty to notify the ECB of supervisory decisions 
of material consequence. 
The governance structure of the ECB will consist of a separate Super- 
visory Board supported by steering committee, the ECB Governing Council, 
and a mediation panel to solve disagreements that may arise between national 
competent authorities and the Governing Council. Clear separation between 
the ECB’s monetary tasks and supervisory tasks is fully ensured. 
For cross-border banks active both within and outside member states par- 
ticipating in the SSM, existing home/host supervisor coordination procedures 
will continue to exist as they do today. To the extent that the ECB has taken 
over direct supervisory tasks, it will carry out the functions of the home and 
host authority for all participating Member States. 
The rules on the functioning of the EBA will be adapted and its role 
reinforced. The EBA will continue developing the single rulebook applicable 
to all 27 member states. In order to foster consistency and efficiency of 
supervisory practices across the whole Union, it will develop a single super- 
visory handbook. It will also ensure that regular stress-tests are carried out to 
assess the resilience of European banks. 
There will be safeguards for non-euro zone member states by means of 
double majority voting requirements for EBA decisions on mediation and on 
technical standards. This ensures that decisions are backed by both a majority 
of the participating and the non-participating Member States. 
 
3.3. The Transformation of Monetary Policy 
 
Monetary policy in the euro zone lies in the hands of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB). It comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the national central banks. The ECB is a supranational institution that is 
moreover to a great extent independent from EU political decision-making. 
The highest decision making body of the ECB is the Governing Council 
comprising the members of the Executive Board and the governors of the 
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national central banks of the euro area countries. The Executive Board con- 
sists of six members, the president, the vice-president and four members, all 
of them chosen for their recognized professional experience in monetary and 
banking matters. They are appointed by common accord of the governments 
of the euro area at the highest level. The Governing Council and the Exec- 
utive Board are presided by the president of the ECB (momentarily Mario 
Draghi). The third decision-making body is the General Council, comprising 
of the president and vice-president of the ECB and the presidents of the 
central banks of all EU member states. The ECB and the national central 
banks in the euro area form the Eurosystem. 
The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability. In 
addition it has to support the general economic policy of the EU, but price 
stability has absolute priority. This unique objective simplifies the strategy of 
the Eurosystem vis-à-vis countries were central banks have to pursue multiple 
objective (cf. the Fed in the US). 
An important feature of the statutes of the system is the independence of 
the ECB from political government. Personal as well as functional independence 
are guaranteed. The personal independence is secured by the procedure for 
the appointment of the members of the Executive Board and of the governors 
of the national central banks. The members of the Board are appointed for a 
non-renewable term of eight years and the governors for a term of five years. 
They can only be removed by the Court of Justice in case of incapacity or of 
serious misconduct. Functional independence is guaranteed by Article 7 of 
the statutes of the ESCB: “Neither the ECB nor a national central bank nor 
any member of their decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions 
from community institutions or bodies, from any government of a member 
state or from any other body.” It is not permitted for the Eurosystem to make 
loans to governments. That the ECB is indeed highly independent is seen in 
a comparison of central bank independence based on five indicators by De 
Haan (1997). The ECB scores the maximum on three indicators and just 
below the maximum for the remaining two indicators. 
Price stability is defined as a year-on-year increase of the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices in the euro area of below 2%. The operational 
variables for monetary policy used by the ECB are the interest rates on the 
money market. To steer these interest rates in the money market the ECB has 
at its disposal open market operations, standing facilities and reserve require- 
ments. The most important instruments of open market operations are the main 
refinancing operations that provide liquidity with a frequency and maturity of 
one week. The interest rate for this liquidity – the main refinancing operations 
rate – is the central rate in the system and attracts a lot of media attention. In 
May 2013 it was put at 0.50%. Besides this facility the ECB also holds 
longer-term refinancing operations with maturities of three months. The stand- 
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ing facilities offer lending and deposit facilities for the overnight money of 
banks. The marginal lending facility allows banks to obtain liquidity, while 
the deposit facility allows them to deposit superfluous overnight money. For 
the first facility a rate of 1% was valid in May 2013, while the rate for the 
deposit facility was 0%. The reserve requirements oblige banks to hold min- 
imum reserves in accounts with the national central banks (2% of deposits 
until the beginning of 2012, since then 1%). 
Since the financial crisis the ECB has ventured unknown paths. Besides 
price stability (and the brand new supervisory tasks, cf. supra) avoiding 
systemic risk by providing financial means has become important. New 
facilities were designed by the ECB as well for financial institutions as for 
governments of member states. 
From the start of tensions in the interbank markets in August 2007, the 
ECB accommodated the funding needs of banks. The banks needed to build 
up daily liquidity buffers so as to reduce uncertainty about their liquidity 
positions. In particular, the ECB de facto provided unlimited overnight liquidity 
to banks, allocating €95 billion on the first day. Later on, the ECB conducted 
supplementary refinancing operations with maturities of up to 6 months, 
compared with a maximum of 3 months in normal times. Temporary swap 
lines were established with other central banks, primarily to address the 
mounting pressure in short-term US dollar funding markets. As a result, the 
tensions in the short-term segment of the euro area money market abated 
considerably. 
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, 
the uncertainty about the financial health of major banks worldwide led to a 
collapse in financial activity. Banks built up large liquidity buffers, while 
shedding risks from their balance sheets and tightening loan conditions. Given 
the crucial importance of banks for the financing of the euro area economy, 
this situation was alarming in view of a high risk of a credit crunch and a 
high risk of the central bank’s inability to steer monetary conditions. 
The ECB, like other major central banks, rapidly reduced its key interest 
rates to historically low levels, but a key element of its response to retain 
effectiveness in influencing monetary conditions consisted of non-standard 
policy measures. The ECB adopted a number of these non-standard measures 
to support financing conditions and credit flows to the euro area economy 
over and beyond what could be achieved through the normal reductions in 
key interest rates alone.  
The main components of these measures concerned a fixed-rate full allot- 
ment tender procedure for all refinancing operations during the financial 
crisis and the extension of the maturity of liquidity provision. The maximum 
maturity of the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) was temporarily 
extended (to 12 months in June 2009). In combination with the first element, 
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this contributed to keeping money market interest rates at low levels. Besides 
these two elements other features of the ECB approach included the exten- 
sion of collateral eligibility, currency swap agreements and the introduction 
of a covered bond purchase program (CBPP). The aim of this last program 
was to revive the covered bond market, which is a primary source of funding 
for banks in large parts of the euro area.  
The evidence available suggests that the non-standard measures taken in 
October 2008 have been instrumental in stabilizing the financial system and 
the economy, as well as in ensuring price stability.  
In early 2010 the euro area sovereign debt crisis began with acute market 
expectations about a possible Greek sovereign default, with a risk of impact 
on Ireland, Portugal, and even Spain and Italy. In May 2010 some secondary 
markets for government bonds began to dry up completely; large-scale sale 
offers faced virtually no buy orders and yields reached levels that would have 
quickly become unsustainable for any sovereign. To help calm the market 
down and support a better functioning of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the ECB established its Securities Markets Programme (SMP). 
Under the SMP, interventions could be carried out in the euro area public and 
private debt securities markets, strictly limited however to secondary markets.  
When the sovereign debt crisis struck Italy and Spain in the summer of 
2011 the ECB decided to “actively implement its Securities Markets Pro- 
gramme” (Statement by the ECB President, 7 August 2011) that had been 
dormant for several months. Significant and sustained interventions at varying 
intensity in the following weeks temporarily eased the situation in government 
bond markets. 
In the autumn, however, the euro area banking system came increasingly 
under strain, calling for a response. The ECB provided banks not only with a 
short-term liquidity support but also with a sufficient perspective so that they 
would maintain credit lines.  
Key in this response were the two 3-year Long Term Refinancing Oper- 
ations. The assignments took place on 21 December 2011 and 29 February 
2012 respectively. They took the form of fixed rate tenders at an interest rate 
equal to the main refinancing rate averaged over the entire maturity. The 
Eurosystem assigned € 489 bln in the first transaction and € 530 bln in the 
second one. Since these transactions partly replaced operations coming to 
maturity, the net injection of liquidity amounted to € 210 bln and € 311 bln 
respectively. 
On 6 September 2012 the ECB decided on a scheme to intervene in sec- 
ondary sovereign bond markets subject to strict and effective conditionality, 
the so-called Outright Monetary Transactions OMT. The effectiveness of 
these OMT crucially depends on member states taking the necessary steps to 
contribute to the stability of the euro area. This is made clear with the strict 
 94 
conditionality of the OMT. The OMT differ from the SMP in the strict con- 
ditionality of the former. 
It should be stated clearly that until now no changes in terms of statutes 
of the ESCB/ECB have been made concerning the conduct of monetary 
policy. The changes made concern the assigning of a supervisory role to the 
ECB, with a clear firewall between monetary policy and the supervisory 
role. Moving away from the legislative framework one can however see a 
broadening of the action radius of the ECB. The avoidance of systemic risk 
through LTRO and OMT has taken the ECB in the field of fiscal policy. 
Although denied by the ECB (Draghi 2013) this move elicits questions on 
the independence of the ECB. Especially with OMT, where bonds issued by 
member states governments are bought by the ECB on the secondary market, 
the ECB seems to engage in policies that accommodate the governments in 
their fiscal policies, instead of remaining in its own field of monetary policy. 
 
3.4. Analysis in Terms of Horizontal and Vertical Shifts 
 
The preceding paragraphs offer a descriptive account of the transformations 
in the EU economic governance. The next step is to systematize these trans- 
formations. We do this by listing the concrete elements of the mentioned 
transformations that contain the kind of shifts discussed in section 2. This is 
done in table 2 were 37 shifts of power are enumerated. Of these 37 shifts 19 
are in the domain of fiscal union, 8 in banking union and 10 in monetary 
policy. It should be noted that the nature of these power shift is very hetero- 
geneous. Some power shifts are enacted in legislation (f.i. operationalization 
of the debt criterion), others are de facto policy measures already implemented 
(f.i. the Outright Monetary Transactions), yet others exist only in proposals 
(f.i. Eurobonds).  
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Table 2 List of power shifts 
  Changes (shifts) Code Status 
Fiscal union operationalization of debt criterion FU1 in force 
  new expenditure rule FU2 in force 
  
need to improve structural balance with at least 0,5 % of GDP 
annually FU3 in force 
  limit of -0,5 % of GDP on structural balance FU4 in force 
  
interest bearing deposit of 0,2 % of GDP in case of significant 
deviation of MTO FU5 in force 
  extra monitoring under EDP FU6 in force 
  fines come earlier at 0,2 % of GDP FU7 in force 
  fine to maximum 0,5 % of GDP in case of statistical fraud FU8 in force 
  
decisions on sanctions in EDP with reversed qualified majority 
voting FU9 in force 
  earlier and higher surveillance for problem countries FU10 in force 
  
national budgetary processes have to be based on independent 
macro-economic projections FU11 in force 
  member states have to introduce numerical fiscal rules FU12 in force 
  
member states have to establish independent fiscal councils to 
monitor compliance with fiscal rules FU13 in force 
  European Financial Stabilization Mechanism FU14 in force 
  European Financial Stability Facility FU15 in force 
  European Stability Mechanism FU16 in force 
  issuing of Stability Bonds FU17 
proposal 
12/2011 
  establishing EU fiscal capacity FU18 
proposal 
12/2012 
  establishing European Ministry of Finance to impose sanctions FU19 
proposal 
04/2013 
Banking 
Union 
establishing European Systemic Risk Board for 
macroprudential supervision BU1 in force 
  establishing European Banking Authority (+ EIOPA & ESMA) BU2 in force 
  
establishing European System of Financial Supervision for 
microprudential supervision BU3 in force 
  
establishing Single Supervisory Mechanism for banks of 
eurozone members BU4 in force 
  enforcement of role of EBA BU5 decided 
  single rulebook for entire EU BU6 decided 
  single bank resolution mechanism BU7 proposal 
  common deposit guarantee scheme BU8 proposal 
Monetary 
policy unlimited overnight liquidity to banks (August 2007) MP1 implemented 
  
supplementary refinancing operations over 6 months (rest 
2007) MP2 implemented 
  
Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) over 12 months 
(October 2008, June 2009) MP3 implemented 
  extension of collateral eligibility (October 2008) MP4 implemented 
  currency swaps (October 2008) MP5 implemented 
  Covered Bond Purchasing Programme (October 2008) MP6 implemented 
  Securities Market Programme (May 2010) MP7 implemented 
  Securities Market Programme revived (summer 2011) MP8 implemented 
  LTRO over 3 years (December 2011 & February 2012) MP9 implemented 
  Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (September 2012) MP10 implemented 
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Some power shifts have obviously more impact than others, we do not attach 
weights to the power shifts due to a lack of weighing criterion. 
 
Graph 1 The direction of power shifts 
 
 
Next we chart the power shifts (see graph 1). The two levels of government 
are the European and the national level. The three kinds of decision-making are 
discretion, delegation and rules. Vertical shifts occur between government 
levels, horizontal shifts between types of decision-making. Diagonal shifts 
occur when vertical and horizontal shifts are combined. Graph 1 shows that 
from the moment that the credibility dimension is taken into account, the 
simple view of a mere vertical power shift from member states to the Euro- 
pean Union or the Eurosystem becomes invalid. Instead of observing only 
upward pointing vertical arrows we see many arrows pointing in other direc- 
tions. We distinguish the following types: 
• From discretion at the MS level to discretion at the EU level 
• From discretion at the MS level to rules at the EU level 
• From discretion at the MS level to delegation at the EU level 
• From discretion at the MS level to rules at the MS level 
• From discretion at the MS level to delegation at the MS level 
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• From discretion at the EU level to rules at the EU level 
• From discretion at the EU level to delegation at the EU level 
• From discretion at the EU level to discretion at the EU level 
 
The main impact of these insights is on accountability. Vertical shifts from a 
member state government with full discretion to a higher European level of 
government with full discretion poses a problem of accountability in the sense 
of the perceived democratic deficit of the European Union. An extensive 
political science literature exists on the European democratic deficit (Majone 
1998, Moravcsik 2002, Curtin 2007, Jensen 2009). Horizontal shifts away from 
discretion to rules and delegation also create a problem of accountability, but 
in another sense and in another kind of literature. In fact several bodies of 
literature deal with this problem. There is a body of literature in economics 
about the accountability of independent central banks (De Haan 2000). There 
is also literature by economists on accountability of financial supervisors 
(Quintyn 2011). Finally there is a mainly political science body of literature 
on the accountability problems of independent regulatory agencies (Magnetti 
2010). The cross references between these bodies of literature are minimal.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper documents the different shifts of power that are embedded in the 
new EU economic governance that is being implemented to deal with the 
effects of the euro and financial crisis. It is argued that a difference has to be 
made between vertical shifts delegating competences from the level of the 
member states governments to the European level, horizontal shifts of delegat- 
ing competences to independent institutions and rules, and diagonal com- 
binations of vertical and horizontal shifts. The economic frameworks for these 
shifts, respectively fiscal federalism and credibility, were sketched. Next the 
features of the types of shifts were discussed for the three policy domains that 
are covered by the new EU economic governance, i.e. fiscal policy, banking 
supervision and monetary policy. Finally an attempt was made to systematize 
the observed shifts and charting them in a framework consisting of two levels 
of government (national and European) and three methods of decision-
making (discretion, rules and delegation). Charting shows that eight different 
kinds of power shifts are embedded in installing the new economic gover- 
nance. The main impact of this variety of shifts is on accountability. The 
vertical shifts raise other questions than the horizontal shifts. The first kind 
refers to the discussions on the European democratic deficit, while the second 
kind refers to accountability in the context of discretion versus delegation. 
The analysis of these questions is for future research. 
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